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Food processing and distribution involve risk (USDA 2009). Food supply networks are increas-
ingly exposed to food safety and food defense risks partly due to the large volume of shipments 
from domestic and import sources (USDA AMS 2008; Acheson 2007).
1 However, these risks 
could be magnified as a result of error based disruptions from Type I and II errors which cause 
failures in prevention and control measures.  
 
A false positive or Type I disruption occurs when an inspection system incorrectly identifies a 
threat or a diagnostic system incorrectly identifies a food risk cause, so that a safe product is ex-
cluded from the supply chain. Type I disruptions would lead to increased seller’s risk, since the 
seller is exposed to the risk that safe products will be incorrectly devalued. Type I errors are sel-
dom publicly recognized, since they don’t affect consumers, but they can have real economic 
costs to industry. An example of a Type I disruption would be losses incurred when a produce 
shipment is delayed or destroyed at a Port of Entry (POE) due to a false positive “swab” patho-
gen test result that could be different from a detailed “culture test”, or a producer initiates a mass 
recall of finished products, rather than a targeted or limited recall, due to ineffective traceability. 
 
A false negative or Type II disruption occurs when a defective product is distributed to the con-
sumer and causes harm that is extensive enough to create market failure (inefficient allocation of 
goods and services) as a result of the failure to detect the problem or correctly diagnose the 
cause. Type II disruptions would lead to an increase in buyer’s risk, since the buyer experiences 
the costs associated with the resulting illnesses or deaths. Examples of Type II disruptions are 
failures to detect accidental contamination from foodborne pathogens, counterfeiting, and adul-
teration. Some obvious recent examples of Type II disruptions are the melamine adulteration in 
powder milk powder and the 2006 - Salmonella contamination of spinach, both of which led to 
multiple fatalities. The melamine adulteration episode resulted from an inspection system’s fail-
ure to detect an intentional, commercially motivated set of actions by some individuals. 
 
The purpose of this study is to assist management, in a business to business (B2B) supply chain 
that “exceeds” minimal government requirements, to design systems to detect, prevent, and re-
spond to food safety/defense risks in the food supply networks by learning from error based dis-
ruptions. While the overarching goal of a control oriented security system is to simultaneously 
minimize Type I and Type II errors, system improvement can take the form of a reduction in one 
or both types of error based disruptions or from achievement of cost reductions. We propose that 
                                                            
1 Food safety can be defined as food system reliability – reducing exposure to natural hazards, errors, and failures. It 
is the unintentional contamination of food, which may have dangerous and lingering consequences (Acheson, 2007). 
Food defense, on the other hand, is system resiliency – reducing the impact of intentional system attacks from 
disgruntled employees, terrorists, etc. Chalk (2003) noted that, in the last century, there were several documented 
cases where pathogenic agents were used to intentionally infect livestock or contaminate food. In September 1984 
Salmonella food poisoning occurred in The Dalles, near Portland, Oregon when a Rajneeshee group intentionally 
contaminated restaurant salad bars and caused 751 cases of food poisoning. These individuals were trying to 
influence a local election. This group also had possession of strains of the causative organism for typhoid fever 
(Torok, Tauxe, and Wise, 1997). Similar eco-terrorist factions have used plant toxins in Africa (Carus, 1999), 
anthrax in the UK (Chalk, 2003) and potassium cyanide in Sri Lanka (Cameron, Pate, and Vogel, 2001) to 
intentionally contaminate food. The term “food protection” is an umbrella term used to define food supply system 
safety and defense.  
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control oriented systems differ fundamentally from systems designed to protect against disrup-
tions caused by uncontrollable rare events such as hurricanes, strikes or earthquakes. One way 
that this difference can be understood is to note that error based disruptions only occur if there 
are inadequate detection and diagnostic processes intended to control potentially disruptive de-
fects or events (Lee & Wolfe 2003). Once a detection or diagnostic system fails, the normal 
function of the supply network delivers the defective product to the consumer. This type of prob-
lem is thus qualitatively distinct and is further complicated by the complexity of the supply net-
work system.  
 
Error Based Disruptions and Network Complexity 
 
We discuss error based disruption from our understanding of trans-border food supply networks. 
These networks meet our requirement of including distributed inspection, diagnosis and preven-
tion systems that can be the focus of continuous improvement in control. Trans-border food sup-
ply networks are also distinct as they might be easier targets for food terrorism or be subject to 
multiple risk factors, including smuggling drugs and human trafficking. The first issue we need 
to address is that of threat. We assume, drawing on the threat-vulnerability-consequence model 
(Cox 2008; Nganje et al. 2009), that threats are the risk of a food safety outbreak or food terror-
ism attack arising in any part of the supply network. The kinds of security problems that give rise 
to threats may be unintentional, as most food borne pathogens contamination appears to be, or 
intentional, as in adulteration episodes by disgruntled employees or terrorist actions. Food adul-
teration, whether as a terrorist act or a commercially motivated one, is a principal concern in this 
kind of security system.  
 
The motivations of the individuals or groups who engage in these behaviors may be political or 
economic. In either case the intention is to pass unsafe product through the system without detec-
tion. This is a significantly important issue because, in adulteration episodes, intentional con-
cealment can be designed to exploit weaknesses in existing security systems. One favorable as-
pect of intentional behavior is that it often has a point source that, if identified, can lead to the 
elimination of the threat. Many more error based disruptions will be unintentional, resulting from 
combinations of events in the food supply network or from normal conditions. Because the cause 
of these threats can be complex (i.e. have no point source) and because contributing events can 
be dispersed across the supply network, detection and prevention of unintentional, error based 
disruptions can be very difficult. 
  
Figure 1 presents a control oriented process map of shipment, inspection, detection, trace, and 
prevention in the trans-border food supply, identifying error based disruption points and subse-
quent opportunities for improvement. We discuss the potential failure points in the flow in terms 
of risk, protection and safety, and then discuss patterns of response that can improve prevention 
and thus reduce risk while increasing food protection (safety and defense).  
 
The product is shipped and inspected, as shown in the central horizontal axis of Figure 1. Inspec-
tion can be performed by a third party (government inspectors at a port of entry), by the carrier, 
or by the buyer. Every inspection has the potential to generate an error based disruption (Baker 
& Shuck. 1975; Fortune. 1979). The risk that inspection will generate an error is termed vulnera-
bility in the threat vulnerability and consequence (TVC) model (Cox. 2008). This model will be Nganje and Skilton / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




extended to include the preventive actions management could implement to mitigate Type I and 
Type II errors associated with food protection.  
 
Inspection can fail to detect a threat or can incorrectly identify a threat. If a threat is identified, it 
can either be verified (as in a two stage inspection process) or not. A positive test that is not veri-
fied represents a potential false positive or Type I error. If a threat is detected, the shipper and 
buyer are likely to take action to remove the supposedly unsafe food product from the system, 
resulting in the loss of the load and, potentially, in the disruption of all products from the source 
associated with the threat. This is the seller’s risk of inspection (Nganje et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Control oriented supply network security process map 
 
 
Every Type I error that occurs and is detected in verification represents an opportunity to im-
prove the inspection system (Scazzero & Longnecker 1991; Stewart et al. 2007) in ways that di-
rectly reduce cost. Because systems that are overly sensitive will generate a larger number of 
Type I errors, the resulting opportunities for continuous improvement in inspection are more 























































OriginNganje and Skilton / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




Shuck 1975; Fortune 1979; Scazzero & Longnecker 1991; Stewart et al. 2007). More accurate 
systems may require more frequent sampling or information sharing between stakeholders and 
more timely results may require the co-location of testing facilities with inspection stations. Be-
cause Type I errors only occur when an inspection system has a specific target, the frequency of 
these errors also depends on the variety of threats the inspection systems are designed to detect. 
Most inspections at borders are primarily concerned with agricultural pests and trafficking in 
people or contraband (Nganje et al. 2009). Because more encompassing, more accurate and more 
timely inspections presumably increase costs, managers will assess the risk of these disruptions 
relative to those costs. Because the cost of a false positive may be low (no illness or deaths) rela-
tive to other types of disruptions, managers may accept the cost of these disruptions rather than 
improving the inspection system to prevent false positive results. This may be especially the case 
when defect rates are very low, since low defect rates may be associated with a greater incidence 
of Type I errors, such as swab pathogen tests which catch borderline cases. 
 
If a threat is correctly detected during inspection and verified (a true positive), the threat will be 
removed, and the system may initiate an investigation into the failure to prevent the threat, as we 
discuss in greater detail below. This should be a normal practice in a continuous improvement 
orientation in supply chain security (Lee and Whang 2005). In a complex supply network, con-
tinuous improvement will require an improvement process that extends to the carrier, the suppli-
er, and any intermediate agents.  
 
If a true threat is not detected in inspection, the potential for a disruption resulting from a Type II 
detection error is created. For an actual disruption to occur the product must both be consumed 
and consumption must show recognizable consequences, such as a reported food borne illness or 
death. In a food supply system, products that are not consumed will not cause illness or deaths. 
In addition, some defective products may be consumed without actually creating consequences. 
These scenarios represent ‘near misses’ – Type II errors that are non-consequential but still rep-
resent opportunities for continuous improvement.  
 
We therefore see the consequences of Type II errors as being driven by the risk that an error will 
be costly – that it will actually have a noticeable effect. These food risks are characterized by 
class I, II, and III recalls by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A Class I recall is a situa-
tion in which there is a reasonable probability that the use of or exposure to a contaminated food 
product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death. A Class II recall is a situation 
in which the use of or exposure to a contaminated food product may cause temporary or medical-
ly reversible adverse health consequences or where the probability of serious adverse health con-
sequences is remote. A Class III recall is a situation in which use of or exposure to a contaminat-
ed food product is not likely to cause adverse health consequences (USDA-FDA 2009).  
 
Based on studies of accidents in other complex systems (Perrow 1999; Sagan 1993; Weick & 
Roberts 1993) it is very possible that lapses in inspection programs represent the majority of 
Type II errors in food supply systems. This is because the observed rate of disruptions is a func-
tion of the effectiveness of inspections
2, the consumption rate and the use of alternative risk re-
                                                            
2   FDA operations inspect about 1% of the imported foods it regulates, down from 8% in 1992 when imports were 
far less prevalent (Schmidt, 2007). 
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duction strategies (e.g., cooking the product well). If the severity of Type II errors is underesti-
mated it leads to inaccurate assessments of systemic risk which, in turn, influences decision pro-
cesses concerning internal and external security policy (Cox 2008; Nganje et al. 2009; Verduzco, 
Villalobos & Vega 2001; Voss et al. 2009; Voss, Whipple & Closs 2009). Inaccurate assessment 
of Type II severity is a potential major failing in many food supply chain security systems, with 
frequent occurrences of food recalls resulting from the system failing to identify contaminated 
products. 
 
The most extreme consequence of a Type II disruption in the food supply system is that one or 
more consumers gets sick or dies. Product recalls and supply disruptions are the almost inevita-
ble consequences of Type II disruptions. Far more than Type I disruptions, Type II disruptions 
lead to calls to improve inspection systems. Unlike inspection improvement efforts resulting 
from Type I disruptions, efforts following Type II disruptions nearly always involve increasing 
the sensitivity and scope of inspections and policy. Once supply chains, brands and firm survival 
are threatened by a Type II disruption, managers become much less concerned with the cost of 
inspection and prevention improvements. The need for inspection to be seen as taking action can 
create new occasions for increased seller’s risk, since the actions taken will not necessarily im-
prove diagnosis, inspection or prevention (Verduzco, Villalobos & Vega 2001). For example, the 
Bioterrorism Act of 2004 only requires improvements in record keeping that improve traceabil-
ity, without requiring changes in inspection or prevention methods. Improvements to traceability 
may create opportunities for improved protection and safety, but these opportunities must be ex-
ploited to achieve actual improvements. This risk of ineffective controls legitimizes our empha-
sis on cost, since it provides a basis for making choices between investments in inspection, diag-
nosis and prevention. 
 
Investments following Type II disruptions resulting from inspection errors can be aimed at im-
proving inspection or at diagnosing causes, thereby enabling prevention oriented investments 
aimed at reducing threats. Diagnostic processes, which are usually called traceability processes, 
have the potential to fail, which we call diagnostic risk. Diagnostic systems can produce false 
positives (Type I diagnostic error) and false negatives (Type II diagnostic error), by providing 
timely and targeted recalls when there is a known food borne disease outbreak. 
 
How likely a Type II diagnostic error is to occur depends in large part on the structure of the 
supply  network.  Because  traceability  involves  identifying  and  verifying  the  components  and 
chronology of events in all steps of a process chain, Skilton and Robinson (2009) propose that its 
effectiveness is a function of the level of complexity in the supply network on one hand and the 
degree of tight coupling within the supply network on the other. In systems where supply net-
works are relatively simple and tightly coupled through integrated process structures and coordi-
nated information exchange, traceability is a relatively straightforward process. We suspect that 
systems with these characteristics, which we associate with branded goods and processed food, 
are also likely to have relatively low levels of diagnostic risk. Although Pomonarov and Hol-
comb (2009) argue that the risk of disruption is greatest for such firms, we suggest that, because 
the consequences of disruption are perceived as greater, these firms are more likely to have sys-
tems that allow accurate diagnosis of errors. These food supply networks will be able to quickly 
trace the causes of disruptions. As network complexity increases, diagnostic risk will tend to in-
crease, particularly if complexity reduces the timeliness and accuracy of information flows, or Nganje and Skilton / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




compliance with security measures. Because traceability and diagnosis will be less effective, 
fewer opportunities for improvement will emerge. Supply chain managers will be confronted 
with a need to trade-off the benefits of network complexity against the costs of tight coupling 
and information coordination which enable rapid traces and accurate diagnosis. 
 
Diagnostic risk will be greatest in supply networks that are loosely coupled and complex (Skilton 
& Robinson 2009). In these networks, which are relatively common in the commodity sectors of 
the food supply system, it can be very difficult to accurately diagnose the causes of disruptions. 
Because networks are complex and entangled, inaccurate diagnosis can create Type I diagnostic 
errors that compound the cost of the initial disruption. One example of a Type I disruption in 
tracing was the incorrect association of tomatoes with salmonella contamination in 2007. This 
false positive diagnosis led to a nationwide tomato recall that cost growers and packers more 
than $30 million (USDA 2008). 
 
Although the risk of diagnostic errors is greater in complex, loosely coupled networks, security 
efforts are often substantially lower in these networks because the participants have significantly 
lower investments in brand and reputation to protect, reducing the perceived severity of failures. 
These factors combine to make this the sector most exposed to consequential error based disrup-
tions. Reduced prevention and inspection increase the likelihood of Type II errors, and a loose 
network structure will impede traceability and improvement efforts. This environment also in-
vites intentional food contamination. While food terrorist actions have been infrequent (Chalk 
2003; Engel 2000), intentional adulteration for commercial reasons was the source of the Chi-
nese infant formula melamine poisoning event (Chao 2007) and is probably more common than 
is generally recognized. The threat of supplier opportunism should be as much a consideration in 
supply chain security as terrorism is (Roth et al. 2007; Voss et al. 2009). 
 
When an accurate trace is carried out and the source or agents are identified, the system has an 
opportunity to improve prevention. In the food supply network, preventive security measures in-
clude supplier selection standards, supplier development and certification, facility design and 
protection processes, employee screening and training, shipment tracking, process integration 
and process monitoring (Closs & McFarrell 2004; Lee & Whang 2005; Roth et al. 2007; Voss, 
Whipple & Closs 2009; Williams, Lueg & May 2008). The presence of known inspection pro-
cesses may serve to prevent some kinds of threats from being deployed (Chao 2007), but tests 
that are too narrow may invite other specific kinds of threats. Supply chain security personnel 
should remain aware that intentional threats in particular will tend to adapt to changes in security 
systems (Chalk 2003; Cox 2008). When intentional disruptions occur and can be traced, manag-
ers are faced with the dubious luxury of having an identifiable point source of a set of actors who 
can be prosecuted or whose access to the system can be removed. 
 
Changes to preventive measures often follow from successful traces in response to Type II dis-
ruptions at the moment when cost-based resistance is least and the perception of risk is greatest. 
They are often adopted as governmental initiatives (e.g., U.S. Customs initiatives such as C-
TPAT and advanced electronic notice of shipping manifests) or industry initiatives (California 
Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement, ISO 28000 standards addressing supply chain security; the 
International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code). Gov-
ernmental and industry level initiatives have the advantage of leveling the playing field in terms Nganje and Skilton / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




of implementation costs, but may not provide enough incentives for all parties along the supply 
chain to fully adopt food risk mitigation strategies (e.g., smaller firms may be given more time to 
implement a policy or acquire more resources). Strong central players in supply networks can 
complement federal efforts by imposing their own more stringent standards on producers and 
distributors, such as Wal-Mart’s sustainability and food safety initiatives (Rosenbloom 2008). In 
the next section we discuss a comprehensive detection, prevention, and response framework that 
managers and policy makers could use to mitigate food risks and error based disruptions. 
 
 
A Control Oriented Framework and Reduction of Type I and Type II Errors 
 
A comprehensive detection, prevention, and response framework would have four major compo-
nents: 1) to identify the roles and synergies of multiple stakeholders, 2) to establish procedures to 
assess threats, vulnerability, and consequences along the food supply chain, 3) to identify incen-
tives for management to adopt and implement controls oriented risk mitigation plans and 4) to 
develop a feedback system for response and continuous improvement. 
 
A major challenge with having multiple stakeholders is how to identify synergies which may 
lead to developing consistent risk mitigation policies. One approach may be to use Scenario 
Method Analysis, a qualitative approach for determining drivers and dependent variables.
3 This 
would provide a framework to avoid duplication but yet facilitate validation so that the cost and 
risks associated with Type I and II errors are minimal.   
 
Figure 2 describes a conceptual framework to address the last three components of the threat-
vulnerability-consequence model (Cox 2008; Nganje et al. 2009). The process map visualized in 
Figure 1 and described above contains the elements necessary for a theoretical framework of 
control oriented management in supply chain security systems. This framework defines the va-
rieties of risk inherent in security systems and relates them to the investments and commitments 
necessary to achieve a balance between security costs and benefits. Figure 2 provides a systemic 
view of costs and risks and the relationships between them. How managers respond to opportuni-
ties for controlling threats and costs governs the evolution of supply chain security systems. Fig-
ure 2 provides a road map for the definitions and propositions that follow. 
 
Beginning in the upper left corner of the figure, it seems self-evident that threats have causes (+ 
indication). In most security oriented studies, the causes of threats are treated purely as exoge-
nous. As shown in Figure 2, in a control oriented framework, this is not the case. The causes of 
                                                            
3 Scenario Method Analysis provides a qualitative approach to identify influence and dependent factors for the short-
run (direct effects) and long-run (indirect effects with second- and third-order interaction) to enable all stakeholders 
determine what synergies and contributions in mitigating food risks should be considered.  The Micmac Scenario 
Method is based on the formulation by Godet (1987).  The analysis involves developing a database of important 
variables/factors from existing literature or survey, determining the relationship between factors (with 0 = no rela-
tionship and 3 = very strong impact), analyzing and classifying variables into four major quadrants: strong depend-
ent and influence variables, strong dependent and weak influence variables, weak dependent and strong influence 
variables, and weak dependent and influence variables.  The method derives second- and third-order interactions 
between factors from three environments: internal firm environment, external policy environment, and the competi-
tive market environment. The MicMac Software is used to perform the analysis.  
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threat may initially be poorly understood, but an important goal of a control oriented system 
should be to understand causes of contamination in order to eliminate or control them (Bohn 
1994; Lee & Whang 2005). Improved knowledge of control factors achieved through diagnostic 
processes often results in preventive measures, to which we will return at the conclusion of this 
section. 
 
We have defined threats as the perceived risk of a defect or attack in a specified supply chain. 
We define vulnerability as the risk of errors in detection systems. Threats can arise at any point 
in a supply chain. For convenience we will conceptualize threats to be associated with shipments, 
but threats could equally be associated with facilities or personnel. The whole purpose of control 
oriented supply chain security systems is to estimate and control threats. This means that threats 















































Figure 2. Control oriented supply network security conceptual model 
 
 
Proposition 1 The relationship between threat, vulnerability, and investment in detection will 
be non-linear but positive, so that investment will grow less quickly as threats increase. 
 
Arguments for Proposition 1. We assume, as many others have, that as threats increase, partic-
ipants in supply chains will increase their investments in systems designed to detect defects and 
attacks before they reach the markets that are their targets. This is in contrast to protection ori-
ented supply chain security systems that invest in hardening targets or creating back-up systems. 
In control oriented supply chain security systems, these investments relate primarily to inspec-Nganje and Skilton / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




tion systems. Such investments can improve the sensitivity of inspections, the accuracy of in-
spections or both. We further propose that there are decreasing returns to detection systems such 
that, as the probability of defects or attacks increases, improvements in detection resulting from 
additional investments will diminish. When the threat is low, the benefits of additional invest-
ments in inspection systems (such as frequent sampling) will be constrained by the likelihood 
that greater sensitivity will increase the Type 1 error rate. As threats increase, benefits from addi-
tional investment will initially rise, and then plateau. Highly probable defects will be easier to 
detect with lower sampling rates and lower levels of investment, so that the form of the relation-
ship between threat and investment in detection is likely to take an inverted U shape (presented 
in Figure 2). This could be illustrated best with the knowledge that as we increase investment in 
sampling and testing for pathogens we could produce both Type I and Type II errors. Investing 
in a more sensitive inspection system will decrease the likelihood of Type II errors while poten-
tially increasing the likelihood of Type I errors. The real question here is whether investing in 
detection systems increases the net risk of combined Type I and Type II errors. We would argue 
that, in control oriented systems, investments to improve accuracy will decrease Type II errors 
without increasing Type I errors because the efficiency of all control units will be improved. On 
the other hand, investments in the detection of contamination will increase Type 1 errors while 
reducing Type 2.  
 
Proposition 2. Vulnerability is positively related to consequence. 
 
Arguments for Proposition 2. Consequences, which we define as the expected cost of disrup-
tions, are positively related to vulnerability. The more vulnerable a security system is, the more 
likely it is that an error will occur resulting in a system disruption. How consequential a disrup-
tion is depends on the ways the product is used and by whom. A market failure resulting from a 
Type 1 error that leads a producer to withdraw a product that is actually safe could be as conse-
quential as a complete market failure resulting from a terrorist poisoning a food supply. 
  
Proposition 3. Consequence is positively related to investments in detection systems. 
 
Arguments for Proposition 3. As a practical matter we would expect greater consequences, re-
alized or perceived, to be positively related to investments in detection systems. Unlike the rela-
tionship between threats and investments in detection systems, we think that this relationship will 
be linear. Where consequences are very large, managers will take corresponding steps to invest 
in and improve detection. This is a central tenet of research on high reliability systems (Sagan 
1996; Weick & Roberts 1993). Finally, consequences need not be realized to influence behavior. 
The perception that consequences will be high can lead to action. 
 
Once we move beyond consequences, the remainder of the model deals with prevention (Nganje 
et al. 2009; Lee & Whang 2005). One of the principle contributions of this article is the inclusion 
of diagnostic systems designed to trace the root causes of disruptions. This is a key element in a 
prevention and control orientation generally. Only by diagnosing the causes of errors can we 
close the loop and achieve a control oriented system of supply chain security. The framework 
can also serve as a launching point for empirical research. Several of our propositions should be 
easily tested with the right empirical data. Finding support for this or an alternative model of the-
se relationships will have important implications for practice in control oriented supply chain Nganje and Skilton / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




security management. We think this is an important opportunity because most supply chain secu-
rity managers are first and foremost supply chain managers. They will thus have a natural inter-
est not only in achieving control of supply chain security, but also in finding ways to simultane-
ously mitigate threat and control the costs of errors. 
 
Managerial Implications and Feedback for Continuous Improvement 
 
Error based disruptions and risks that managers have opportunities to control are probably the 
most common types of disruption in food supply networks. Because food risks from an individu-
al firm are relatively infrequent, managers are often reluctant to commit to permanent overhead 
costs to prevent them. As with uncontrollable disruptions, however, the consequences of allow-
ing disruptions to take place may be much greater than anticipated. Not only can revenue flows 
be interrupted, often for long periods, but the value of brands can be seriously impaired when 
consumers become sick or die from food hazards.  
 
In this paper we have pointed out a number of factors that make perceptions of the risk of error 
based disruptions inaccurate. First, Type I disruptions are often not considered as failures of the 
security system, when in fact they are. Shipments that are delayed, blocked or recalled when they 
are actually safe may be the major controllable cost in supply network security. This is an area 
where costs arise from compliance with regulations that are too sensitive or where tests are too 
sensitive or both. Type I errors represent an important opportunity for continuous improvement 
in inspection systems, an area that both managers and scholars may have overlooked for too 
long. 
 
Second, the perceptions of risks relating to Type II disruptions may be systematically underesti-
mated if their severity is characterized by a high proportion of near misses. There is a clear op-
portunity for future research to try to quantify and model these unseen costs and risks. 
It is also important to recognize, as we have, that not all supply networks are exposed to the same 
levels of security risk. Highly integrated supply networks organized to include structured distrib-
uted detection and diagnosis processes, sustained relationships and extensive partner monitoring 
are much less likely to be exposed to error based disruptions. When error based disruptions do 
strike these networks they are more likely to be Type I events that do not threaten brand or pro-
duction systems. Supply networks that rely on loosely coupled commodity trading (with complex 
tracing situations) are much more exposed to both Type I and Type II disruptions, and should 
therefore be the focus of management and regulatory agencies. Management wishing to improve 
control over their supply chain security should seriously consider abandoning this type of net-
work in favor of a relatively simple, but more highly integrated structure (e.g., production with a 
contract/food protection environment like the Leafy Greens system). One important reason to do 
this is because it improves traceability, which is the key to improving the preventive measures 
that are necessary to achieve control in supply network security.  
 
Management should address these issues related to information and network complexity to min-
imize errors and costs. Information systems designed for linear, tightly coupled networks will not 
meet the challenges of complex supply networks. Different network structures have to address 
additional problems such as preserving information through transformation processes or the co-
mingling of shipments that simply don’t occur in simple, tightly coupled networks. In tightly Nganje and Skilton / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review / Volume 14, Issue 5, 2011 




coupled networks, a powerful central player can make traceability systems much more effective, 
but only at a high cost in terms of system resources, data quality and the opportunity costs of 
committing to a smaller supplier base for any product. While we think that reconfiguring com-
plex loosely coupled networks toward this more tightly coupled model would improve traceabil-
ity and security, it might come at a high economic cost. This is the risk equation that many sup-
ply networks face, and thus far the tendency has been to maintain the structure and treat security 
failures as an acceptable risk. One area where the rewards of future research may be great will be 
the study of real time information systems (electronic barcodes and radio frequency identifica-
tion devices) and the ways that they can improve accuracy. There is some hope that real time in-
formation can improve control of Type I disruptions and help reduce the rate of near misses in 
Type II disruptions. 
 
There have been proposals that trust and embeddedness in networks that value quality and trans-
parency can enhance traceability at a relatively lower cost (Roth et al. 2007; Skilton & Robinson 
2009).  Continuous  improvement  in  supplier  relationships  to  increase  trust  and  transparency 
(Lamming, Caldwell & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al. 2001) has to be accompanied by continu-
ous attention to and recertification of information flows and integrated processes. While trust and 
transparency may reduce the cost of inspection and prevention, they are not a substitute for such 
measures. Because trust and transparency can reduce perceptions of risk without actually reduc-
ing it, managers need to follow Ronald Reagan’s security dictum: ‘Trust, but verify’.  
 
Although we have emphasized the ways in which current systems can fail, we have done so in 
the spirit of continuous improvement. We think that a continuous improvement approach (Lee 
and Whang 2005), combined with a security orientation (Autry & Bobbit 2009) that embraces a 
willingness to make data based decisions about the cost trade-offs of controlling error based dis-
ruptions will be central to more successful supply chain security management. Only by achieving 
an accurate assessment of total risks can supply chain managers make informed decisions that 
lead to the least costly, most effective, control oriented supply chain security systems. 
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